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EDWARDS V. AGUILLARD: THE SUPREME COURT'S
DECONSTRUCTION OF LOUISIANA'S CREATIONISM
STATUTE
PAUL F. BLEWETT*
Since the celebrated Scopes Monkey Trial of 1927,1 the
debate over the place of creationism in science education has
been relegated to religious forums, while the theory of evolu-
tion has dominated public school science education.' Re-
cently, however, evolution's domination of public school sci-
ence education has been challenged.' Many of the questions
evolution promised to answer have returned to the forefront
of scientific investigation still unanswered." Meanwhile, sev-
eral scientists maintain that evidence supporting a theory of
creation has accumulated to the point of making the theory
at least as plausible as evolution.5 Consequently, some argue
* B.A. 1985, Thomas Aquinas College; J.D. 1989, University of Notre
Dame; Thos. J. White Scholar, 1987-89.
1. Scopes v. State of Tennessee, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363
(1927).
2. The court in McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255
(E.D. Ark. 1982), stated:
[11n 1957, the National Science Foundation funded several pro-
grams designed to modernize the teaching of science in the na-
tion's schools. The Biological Sciences Curriculum Study (BSCS), a
nonprofit organization, was among those receiving grants for cur-
riculum study and revision. Working with scientists and teachers,
BSCS developed a series of biology texts which, although empha-
sizing different aspects of biology, incorporated the theory of
evolution as a major theme. The success of the BSCS effort is
shown by the fact that fifty percent of American school children
currently use BSCS books directly and the curriculum is incorpo-
rated indirectly in virtually all biology texts.
Id. at 1259 (citation and footnote omitted).
3. See id. A federal district court in Arkansas struck down a statute
calling for balanced treatment of evolution and creation-science after a full
trial to determine whether creation-science as found in that Act is science
in any secular sense.
4. See infra notes 33-46 and accompanying text.
5. According to Dr. Dean H. Kenyon, "[c]reationist scientists now
number in the hundreds, possibly in the thousands, in the States and in
other countries." Affidavit of Dr. Dean H. Kenyon in Biology and Bio-
chemistry, Brief for Appellants at A-20, Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct.
2573 (1987) (No. 85-1513) [hereinafter Kenyon Affidavit].
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that the presentation of only evolution in public school sci-
ence programs treat school children unfairly, because the
programs have precluded the presentation of the creation
theory.
In 1981, the Louisiana Legislature, with the stated intent
to protect academic freedom,6 enacted the Balanced Treat-
ment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act (Crea-
tionism Act or Balanced Treatment Act)7 to combat this ap-
parent inequity. The Act required science teachers either to
give equal time to both theories or to teach neither one.'
The Act's purpose was to expose students to more than one
theory concerning the origins of life and also to avoid their
indoctrination.9
Louisiana State Senator William Keith introduced the
Act into the Louisiana State Legislature. Senator Keith con-
fronted the one-sided presentation of evolution when a sci-
ence teacher asked his twelve-year-old son to recant his belief
that God created the world and man and to profess instead
that life resulted from evolution."0 The bill, introduced by
Senator Keith in June 1980, was signed into law in July 1981.
Before the Act took effect, parents, teachers, and religious
leaders challenged its validity and moved for summary judg-
ment on the grounds that the Act was unconstitutional.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana had struck down the Act as an establishment of
religion on the motion for summary judgment. 1 In a panel
decision, three judges of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 2
6. "This Subpart is enacted for the purposes of protecting academic
freedom." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.2 (West 1982).
7. Id. at §§ 17:286.1-17:286.7.
8. The Act read as follows:
(1) "Balanced Treatment" means providing whatever information
and instruction in both creation and evolution models the class-
room teacher determines is necessary and appropriate to provide
insight into both theories in view of the textbooks and other in-
structional materials available for use in his classroom.
Id. at § 17:286.3(1).
9. For an interesting perspective on the indoctrination of school chil-
dren in education science, see Gelfand, Of Monkeys and Men-An Atheist's
Heretical View of the Constitutionality of Teaching the Disproof of a Religion in
the Public Schools, 16 J. LAW & EDuc. 271 (Summer 1987).
10. Joint Appendix at E-74, 75, Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct.
2573 (1987) (No. 85-1513).
11. Aguillard v. Treen, 634 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. La. 1985).
12. Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985).
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En banc review was denied over a strong dissent. 3 In Ed-
wards v. Aguillard,'4 the United States Supreme Court de-
cided whether the Louisiana Balanced Treatment Act vio-
lated the establishment clause of the first amendment. The
Supreme Court held that the Act was facially invalid, thereby
upholding the summary judgment of the lower court en-
joining implementation of the Act.
The Court based its decision on the test used in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,'15 or the Lemon test, 16 which requires that any state
action involving religion must have a clear secular purpose in
order not to violate the establishment clause. Although the
Act explicitly states what appears to be a legitimate secular
purpose," the Court held that the Act's actual purpose was
to "restructure the science curriculum to conform with a par-
ticular religious viewpoint."' 8
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined with Justice Scalia in dis-
sent. Justice Scalia first objected that the case's posture
before the Court required reversal of the summary judg-
ment. He argued that a genuine issue of material fact existed,
namely, the meaning of the term creation-science. Therefore,
without the full evidentiary hearing prevented by summary
judgment or without the Louisiana Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the Act or without the Act's implementation, the
Court could only guess its meaning. 9 He concluded that in-
13. Aguillard v. Edwards, 778 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1985). Circuit
Judge Gee wrote a stinging dissent. He criticized the decision to deny en
banc review. In the preface to his dissent, Judge Gee made an interesting
comparison to the Scopes case:
The Scopes court upheld William Jennings Bryan's view that
states could constitutionally forbid teaching the scientific evidence
for the theory of evolution, rejecting that of Clarence Darrow that
truth was truth and could always be taught-whether it favored
religion or not. By requiring that the whole truth be taught, Loui-
siana aligned itself with Darrow; striking down that requirement,
the panel holding aligns us with Bryan.
Id. at 226.
14. 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
15. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
16. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2576-77. "Three such tests may be
gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular purpose; sec-
ond, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion.'" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612-13 (1971) (citations omitted).
17. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
18. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2582 (1987).
19. Id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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stead, the Court should have remanded for further
consideration. 0
Justice Scalia also objected to the Court's application of
the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test in Edwards. "[I]f
those legislators . . . acted with a 'sincere' secular purpose,
• . . the Act survives the first component of the Lemon test,
regardless of whether that purpose is likely to be achieved by
[it]."'" He continued, saying that the legislative history indi-
cated that the legislators acted with a sincere secular pur-
pose. " Therefore, he concluded, the Act "should survive
Lemon's purpose test."...
Several important legal issues and policy concerns are
implicated in this decision. The legal issues range from estab-
lishment clause interpretation to the principles of statutory
construction. Policy concerns include the possibility that in-
doctrination of school children is occurring in the name of
academic freedom. This comment will focus primarily on the
legal issues raised by this decision.
Part I of this note begins with a short history of Edwards:
how it arose, its development, and its posture before the Su-
preme Court. Following this history is a short presentation of
some of the scientific evidence offered to the Court in affida-
vits on behalf of creationism. Part II summarizes both the
majority and dissenting opinions in Edwards. Part III analyzes
the Court's opinion in Edwards: its interpretation of the es-
tablishment clause and how the Court failed to remain consis-
tent with that interpretation by misapplying the secular pur-
pose prong of the Lemon test. Part III also analyzes the
Court's construction of the Balanced Treatment Act and how
the Court misconstrued the statute by focusing on the moti-
vations of particular legislators rather than by applying ac-
cepted rules of statutory construction. This note concludes
with a short discussion of how Edwards negatively affects aca-
demic freedom.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Lower Court Opinions
In the original action, several plaintiffs filed suit in fed-
eral district court against the State of Louisiana, 4 the Board
20. Id. at 2605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 2593 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
22. Id. at 2596-2600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 2600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
24. For a complete list of the original plaintiffs, see Aguillard v.
Treen, 440 So. 2d 704, 706 n.2 (La. 1983).
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of Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE), and several
individuals, including the then-Governor of Louisiana, David
Treen, later replaced by Edwin Edwards.2 5 The plaintiffs
sought to enjoin the Act and have it declared unconstitu-
tional as violative of the first and fourteenth amendments of
the United States Constitution.
BESE later realigned as a party plaintiff and moved for
summary judgment, contending that the Act violated the
Louisiana State Constitution on the grounds that the legisla-
ture had no power to enact it. The United States district
court granted the motion, holding that the Louisiana Consti-
tution vested BESE with the power to initiate and form edu-
cational policies and not the Louisiana Legislature. There-
fore, the court held that the Act was invalid because the
legislature was powerless to enact it.
On appeal, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit asked that the Louisiana Supreme Court
hear the question concerning the power to form educational
policy. There, the court held that the power rested with the
legislature and, consequently, that the Act did not violate the
Louisiana Constitution. The Louisiana Supreme Court did
not address the question of whether the Act violated the first
amendment of the United States Constitution.
The circuit court then remanded the case to the district
court with instructions to address first and fourteenth amend-
ment issues. The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment because the court saw no issue of ma-
terial fact." The defendants in the case, however, contended
that the definition of science was a genuine issue of material
fact. Still, the court held that "[w]hatever 'science' may be,
'creation,' as the term is used in the statute, involves religion,
and the teaching of 'creation-science' and 'creationism,' as
25. Edwin Edwards was elected governor in the interim between the
original case and the case on appeal.
26. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
there be some issue of material fact and that, if there is no such issue, a
party may move for summary judgment. The rule states as follows:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, to-
gether with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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contemplated by the statute, involves teaching 'tailored to the
principles' of a particular religious sect or group of sects."2
As a result, the district court refused to hear evidence con-
cerning the Act. The court held that "whatever that evi-
dence would be, it could not affect the outcome."28 The
court therefore held that the Act violated the establishment
clause of the first amendment.
On appeal, the circuit court affirmed the lower court's
decision.29 Judge Jolly, writing for the court, said,
"[I]rrespective of whether it is fully supported by scientific
evidence, the theory of creation is a religious belief."30 A
narrowly divided circuit court denied review of the case en
banc. 1 The defendants appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court, which decided to hear the case. After hearing
arguments in December 1986, the Supreme Court affirmed
the lower courts' decisions on June 19, 1987.32 Justice Wil-
liam Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court.
Before turning to the opinion of the Court, however,
and to better appreciate its significance, evidence from affida-
vits by certain experts attesting to the scientific nature of cre-
ation-science first is examined below. This discussion is not
meant to be a complete exposition of the theory of creation-
science. Rather, it is intended to present some of the evi-
dence offered to the Court.
B. Creation-Science
The Act defines creation-science as "the scientific evi-
dences for creation and inferences from those scientific evi-
dences."" Although this theory implies the concept of a cre-
ator, "[t]he concept of a creator is not central to creation-
science, and in any event is not inherently religious, as evi-
denced by ancient and modern nonsupernatural concepts of a
creator . . . ."I Creation in this context means no more
27. Aguillard v. Treen, 634 F. Supp. 426, 427 (1985) (citation
omitted).
28. Id.
29. Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985).
30. Id. at 1253.
31. Aguillard v. Edwards, 778 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1985). The judges
split eight to seven.
32. Edwards v.Aquillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
33. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.3(2) (West 1982).
34. Affidavit of Dr. Terry L. Miethe in Philosophy and Theology,




than "origin through abrupt appearance in complex form
"13s
Dr. Dean Kenyon, 6 in his affidavit for the appellants,
further defined creation-science and evolution. He defined
creation as "origin through abrupt appearance in complex
form, and includes biological creation, biochemical creation,
• . . and cosmic creation. ' '8 7 Evolution, or evolution-science,
he defined as "biological evolution (or organic evolution)
from simple life to all plants and animals, biochemical evolu-
tion (or chemical evolution or prebiotic evolution of the first
life), and cosmic evolution (including stellar evolution) (of the
universe)." '38 Dr. Kenyon distinguished macroevolution and mi-
croevolution, macroevolution being "evolutionary change
above the species level," 3 9 while "[m]icroevolution is change
within local populations at or below the species level." 4 Cre-
ation-scientists do not dispute microevolution. Rather, the
discussion focuses on macroevolution.
The bases for creation-science theory arise largely from
evidence in the fields of paleontology (fossil history), mor-
phology (structural biology), information-science, probability,
and genetics.
Because "[flossils are the only direct evidence we have
that bears on the question of whether macroevolution actu-
ally happened,"4 " expert evidence which suggests that the
fossil record left very little evidence of macroevolution is sig-
nificant. " The evidence offered by Dr. Kenyon suggested
that the fossil record, perhaps the most important evidence
35. Kenyon Affidavit, supra note 5, at A-19.
36. Professor of Biology at San Francisco State University; Ph.D.
1965, Stanford University. Dr. Kenyon's affidavit is relied upon in this dis-
cussion because he clearly presents the bulk of the scientific evidence in
favor of creation-science.
37. Kenyon Affidavit, supra note 5, at A-19.
38. Id.
39. Id. at A-21.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Dr. Kenyon stated:
Over 120 years of paleontological research have not provided any
significant number of "missing links," and there are reasons for
doubting the transition status of those few that have been found.
• . . Since some paleontologists now consider the fossil record to
be reasonably complete, evolutionists are faced with a disturbing
dilemma. Either macroevolution did not occur, or it occurred in
such a way that it left no direct evidence of having occurred.
Id. at A-22 (citation omitted).
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bearing on the matter, lends more support to creation-sci-
ence than it does to evolution.4
Other evidence pertaining to morphological (structural)
considerations also support creation-science. These consider-
ations are based on the fact that "[m]ost populations of orga-
nisms at any given time are in stasis or genetic equilibrium, as
the fossil record indicates. . . .This rather systematic simi-
larity of fossil forms to their modern descendants supports
biological creation."" Put another way, species today are
similar to their ancestors. Organisms do not tend towards
change as macroevolution suggests.
Regarding information-science, or the science relating to
the biological information in RNA and DNA, evidence was
adduced which suggested that this information "must have
been impressed on these polymers from the 'outside'
... "' The information on certain molecules indicates a
very complex design, the existence of which depends on some
sort of outside ordering principle. From this evidence, one
can infer the existence of an intelligent creator, which im-
planted that design in those molecules.
Both probability and genetics cast doubt on the validity
of macroevolution and establish a factual basis for creation-
science. In this regard, "the probability of the spontaneous
origin of living matter can be no greater than one chance in
1040,000, and is probably much lower.""'
Notwithstanding the fact that the evidence offered to the
district court showed that creation-science is not irrational or
necessarily religious, the Supreme Court's opinion never
asked whether there was an issue of material fact as to the
validity of creation-science as scientific theory.' 7 Instead, Jus-
43. The incompatibility of Darwinian evolution and the fact of the
fossil record has led some scientists to posit an evolutionary theory called
punctuated equilibrium. This view contrasts with Darwin's theory because it
posits that evolution occurs rapidly and that few or no fossils are left be-
hind to give evidence of the change. Kenyon concludes, however, that, be-
cause this theory leaves no evidence of its occurrence, "we cannot hope to
find the evidence we need to substantiate the theory" Id. at A-23. For a
full treatment of punctuated equilibrium, see S. GOULD, EVER SINCE DAR-
WIN: REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY (1977).
44. Kenyon Affidavit, supra note 5, at A-25.
45. Id.
46. Id. at A-33 (citation omitted). This estimate is founded on the
research of Sir Fred Hoyle and Chandra Wickramasinghe in F. HOYLE & C.
WICKRAMASINGHE, EVOLUTION FROM SPACE (1981).
47. The Edwards Court saw the main issue before it as being whether
creation-science had a scientific foundation or simply embodied sectarian
religious belief. Compare McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp.
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tice Brennan simply assumed in his objections that creation-
science is religious in nature, based on the opinions of Judge
Jolly in the appellate court and Judge Duplantier in the dis-
trict court. The Court disregarded the affidavits of the scien-
tific experts altogether on the grounds that they were not
given for the purpose of passing the Act, but rather to justify
the Act after it had been challenged."8
II. Edwards v. Aguillard: Majority and Dissent
A. The Majority
In affirming the decisions of the lower courts, the Su-
preme Court applied the secular purpose prong of the Lemon
test and found that the Act failed. In Lemon, the constitution-
ality of state aid to teachers in nonpublic schools was at issue.
In deciding that case, the Supreme Court applied a three-
pronged test49 to the facts to see whether government actions
by the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania Legislatures violated
the establishment clause of the first amendment. The first
prong of the test.simply requires that a "statute must have a
secular legislative purpose."5 Put another way, the action of
a state need not be devoid of any religious motivation in or-
der to satisfy the requirement, so long as it serves some secu-
lar purpose. The Court in Edwards stated, however, that "pe-
titioners have identified no clear secular purpose for the
Louisiana Act.""1 Instead, the Court suggested that the Act is
actually a sham, intending only to promote religion and dis-
credit evolution. The Court based its claim on statements
made by Senator Keith (the Act's sponsor) during the legisla-
tive hearings.52
To reach the conclusion that the Act failed the purpose
prong of the Lemon test, the Court offered five principal ob-
jections to the Act. Three of the objections contended that
the Act served no secular purpose, while two contended that
the Act had a preeminent religious purpose.
1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982), where the federal district court in Arkansas heard a
case arising from a similar act.
48. "The postenactment testimony of outside experts is of little use
in determining the Louisiana legislature's purpose in enacting this statute."
Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2583-84 (1987).
49. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
50. Id.
51. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2578.
52. Id. at 2579.
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Objections to the Act
The Court first objected that "[t]he Act does not grant
teachers a flexibility that they did not already possess to sup-
plant the present science curriculum with the presentation of
theories, besides evolution, about the origin of life."" The
Court cited testimony by the president of the Louisiana Sci-
ence Teachers Association, a party plaintiff, who said,
" '[A]ny scientific concept that's based on established fact can
be included in our curriculum already, and no legislation al-
lowing this is necessary.' "" Therefore, if the aim of the Act
is to grant teachers new freedom to teach various theories,
the Act is superfluous.
The second objection contended that the Act is unfair
because it only calls for financial assistance to creation-science
research and only prohibits discrimination against creation-
scientists. As the Court wrote,
the goal of basic "fairness" is hardly furthered by the Act's
discriminatory preference for the teaching of creation sci-
ence and against the teaching of evolution. While requiring
that curriculum guides be developed for creation science,
the Act says nothing of comparable guides for evolu-
tion. . . . Similarly, research services are supplied for crea-
tion science but not for evolution. . . . The Act forbids
school boards to discriminate against anyone who "chooses
to be a creation-scientist" or to teach "creationism," but
fails to protect those who choose to teach evolution . . . or
who refuse to teach creation science.5
The third objection was that the Act did not further aca-
demic freedom because teachers are not free to teach what
they want. If academic freedom was the purpose of the Act,
"it would have encouraged the teaching of all scientific theo-
ries about the origins of humankind." '5' The Act instead lim-
ited academic freedom, because "teachers who were once
free to teach any and all facets of this subject are now unable
to do so."157 Also, the Act failed to ensure that any theory
would be taught, because a teacher may neglect to teach one
theory and therefore cannot teach the other. In effect, there-
fore, "the Act does not serve to protect academic freedom,
53. Id.
54. Id. (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 2579-80 (citations omitted).




but has the distinctly different purpose of discrediting 'evolu-
tion by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the
teaching of creation science.' ""
The fourth and fifth objections were based on the pre-
mise that the Act had a preeminent religious purpose. The
fourth objection is that, just as in Stone v. Graham,59 where
the Court held that "[tlhe Ten Commandments are undenia-
bly a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths" 0 so in
this case, creation-science advances the undeniably "religious
viewpoint that a supernatural being created humankind."61
Justice Brennan then posited "a historic and contemporane-
ous link between the teachings of certain denominations and
the teaching of evolution." 2 He stated that in Epperson v. Ar-
kansas6" this link was the downfall of a similar Arkansas stat-
ute which had prohibited the teaching of evolution. There,
the Court found that "the First Amendment does not permit
the state to require that teaching and learning must be tai-
lored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or
dogma. ' 64 Likewise in Edwards, the Court found that
"[t]hese same historic and contemporaneous antagonisms be-
tween the teachings of certain religious denominations and
the teaching of evolution are present . ". .. 'I Brennan
based this argument on the premise that "the term, 'creation
science,' as contemplated by the legislature that adopted this
Act, embodies the religious belief that a supernatural creator
was responsible for the creation of humankind." 6 The Court
concluded therefore that the Louisiana Creationism Act vio-
lated the first amendment for the same reason that the Act
involved in Epperson did.
The fifth objection was based on the Act's legislative his-
tory. Once again, Justice Brennan focused on the Act's spon-
sor, Senator Keith, who had stated that his disdain for evolu-
tion gave rise to the Act and that his disdain arose from his
religious beliefs. "The legislation therefore sought to alter
58. Id. (citation omitted).
59. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1104
(1981).
60. Id. at 41 (footnote omitted).
61. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2581 (1987) (footnote
omitted).
62. Id. at 2580-81 (footnote omitted).
63. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
64. Id. at 106.
65. Edwards, 107 S. Ct at 2581.
66. Id. at 2582.
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the science curriculum to reflect endorsement of a religious
view"'67 and therefore promote religion.
Justice Brennan concluded this part of the opinion with a
general discussion of the Act's religious nature. He noted
that the Act was directed at the one scientific theory certain
religious sects traditionally opposed. He also pointed out that
the Court does not "imply that a legislature could never re-
quire that scientific critiques of prevailing scientific theories
be taught."6 Rather, "teaching a variety of scientific theories
about the origins of humankind to schoolchildren might be
validly done with the clear secular intent of enhancing the
effectiveness of science instruction."-69 Once again, however,
he concluded that the Creationism Act failed in this regard,
because its primary purpose was to advance a particular reli-
gious doctrine which violated the establishment clause.
B. The Dissent
Before he addressed the objections by Brennan, Justice
Scalia criticized the whole notion of focussing on the motiva-
tion of particular legislators who supported the Act rather
than on the Act's explicitly stated purpose. He rebuked the
Court for refusing to accept the Louisiana Legislature's
stated intent of academic freedom at face value:
Even if I agreed with the questionable premise that leg-
islation can be invalidated under the Establishment Clause
on the basis of its motivation alone . . . I would still find no
justification for today's decision. The Louisiana legislators
.. . ,each of whom had sworn to support the Constitution,
were well aware of the potential Establishment Clause
problems and considered that aspect of the legislation with
great care. After seven hearings and several months of
study, resulting in substantial revision of the original propo-
sal, they approved the Act overwhelmingly and specifically
articulated the secular purpose they meant it to serve."
This objection stemmed from the affirmation of the summary
judgments of the lower courts. As Justice Scalia pointed out,
because the Act was struck down in the manner of summary
judgment, the case for the Act was never argued before a
trier of fact. Furthermore, the Louisiana Supreme Court
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2583.
70. Id. at 2591 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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never interpreted the Act, nor was the Act ever implemented
to allow the Court to judge it by its effects. In Justice Scalia's
eyes, even if the law violates the establishment clause, it is not
clear that it does so from the stated intent of the legislature.
The summary judgment, therefore, was unwarranted and
should have been overturned, and the case should have been
remanded for a trial on the facts. After this preface, Justice
Scalia addressed the objections raised by Justice Brennan in
the majority opinion.
Rebuttal to the Objections
Justice Scalia rebutted Justice Brennan's first objection,
that the Act is superfluous because teachers already were al-
lowed to teach theories other than evolution, arguing that it
is based on a faulty premise, namely, that "academic free-
dom" means the freedom of the teacher to decide which theo-
ries concerning the origin of life are going to be taught.
Freedom of the teacher, however, is not the type of academic
freedom the Louisiana legislators had in mind. As Scalia
points out,
[hiad the Court devoted to this central question of the
meaning of the legislatively expressed purpose a small frac-
tion of the research into legislative history that produced its
quotations of religiously motivated statements by individual
legislators, it would have discerned quite readily what "aca-
demic freedom" meant: students' freedom from
indoctrination.1
Citing from the Act as originally introduced, Scalia stated,
"the 'purpose' section of the Balanced Treatment Act read:
'This Chapter is enacted for the purposes of protecting aca-
demic freedom . . . of students . . . and assisting students in
their search for truth.' 72
The second objection that the Act demonstrated a "dis-
criminatory preference for the teaching of creation sci-
ence," ' had little to do with the secular purpose of the Act,
the dissent argued. The dissent addressed this objection,
however, by pointing out that the result in Epperson effec-
tively outlawed discrimination against teachers professing a
71. Id. at 2601 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
72. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
73. Id. at 2579.
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belief in evolution. 4 Also, the legislators who passed the Act
had reason to believe that a prevalent hostility existed against
creation-scientists. 75 In addition, as Dr. Kenyon noted in his
affidavit for the defendants, "creation-science . . . currently
does not have the benefit of the volume of research that has
been carried out under evolutionist presuppositions. '"6 The
dissent observed that
[i]n light of the unavailability of works on creation science
suitable for classroom use . . . and the existence of ample
materials on evolution, it was entirely reasonable for the
Legislature to conclude that science teachers . . . would
need a curriculum guide on creation science, but not on
evolution .... 7
Justice Scalia responded to the objection that the Act did
not promote academic freedom because teachers were no
longer free to teach any and all facets of the subject by again
disputing the meaning of academic freedom. As in his first
objection, Justice Brennan assumed that the Act was passed
for the sake of the teacher's academic freedom and should
allow the teacher to teach any facet of the subject that he
pleases, presumably even if he deprives the student of knowl-
edge of important facts in a subject. Nowhere does the Act
proscribe the teaching of other theories concerning the ori-
gin of life. Consequently, therefore, the Act allows teachers
to teach other facets of the subject.
The fourth objection is premised on the Act having a
preeminent religious purpose. According to Brennan, just as
in Stone, 8 where the Court held that the Ten Command-
ments could not be posted on a classroom wall because they
are a sacred text, so too creation-science could not be taught,
because it is primarily a religious doctrine.7 9 Justice Scalia re-
buts this objection, arguing that "[i]n all three cases in which
we struck down laws under the Establishment Clause for lack
of a secular purpose, we found that the legislature's sole mo-
74. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Edwards v. Aguillard,
107 S. Ct. 2573, 2602 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. Kenyon Affidavit, supra note 5, at A-18.
77. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2602 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
78. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), reh'g denied,
449 U.S. 1104 (1981).
79. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2580 (1987).
[Vol. 3
CREATIONISM
tive was to promote religion." 8 The stated purpose of Loui-
siana's Act is to protect academic freedom, and the Court
"cannot accurately assess whether this purpose is a 'sham'
. . . until we first examine the evidence presented to the leg-
islature far more carefully than the Court has done." '81
Justice Scalia examined the legislative history and discov-
ered five apparently non-religious or secular effects of the
Act.8" The secular purpose test, however, requires that legis-
lators only believed that the Act had a secular purpose.83
Without a full evidentiary hearing, the Court "[had] no way
of knowing . . . how many legislators believed the testimony
of Senator Keith and his witnesses," 8 who testified that the
Act had a clear secular purpose. Still, "in the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary, [the Court must] assume that many of
them did [believe the testimony]."85 Thus, the Court erred in
holding that the legislators passed the Act wholly for reli-
gious purposes.
To the fifth objection, that the religious fervor of the
legislators gave rise to the Act and that therefore it had a
religious purpose, the dissent answered that if heeded such
an objection would "deprive religious men and women of
their right to participate in the political process."8 The ma-
jority's objection seems directed at the Act's sponsor, Senator
Keith, who was motivated, at least in part by religious con-
cerns. The dissent argued, however, that "political activism
by the religiously motivated is part of our heritage. ' 87 As
proof for this claim, Justice Scalia referred to the abolition-
ists, whose religious belief and fervor helped abolish
slavery.S8
Also, Justice Scalia argued that the Court should not
"presume that a law's purpose is to advance religion merely
80. Id. at 2594 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The three cases to which Scalia
referred are Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39 (1980); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). See also Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), which describes Stone and Epperson as
cases in which the Court invalidated laws "motivated wholly by religious
considerations." Id. at 680 (emphasis added).
81. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2597 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
82. Id. at 2598-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 2598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 2600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
86. Id. at 2594 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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because it 'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets
of some or all religions,' . . . or because it benefits religion,
even substantially."" If creation-science has a secular pur-
pose which is in the interest of the children in public schools,
then the personal motivations of the legislators passing the
Act should be one of the least considerations. As examples of
similar Acts, Justice Scalia cited Harris v. McCrae9 ° and Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland," where the Court "turned back Estab-
lishment Clause challenges . . . despite the fact that 'both
agre[e] with the dictates of [some] Judaeo-Christian religions
Finally, the dissent criticized the Court's refusal to view
the affidavits of several experts in behalf of the Act. The
Court stated that "the postenactment testimony of outside
experts is of little use in determining the Louisiana legisla-
ture's purpose in enacting the statute."" This, in spite of the
fact that " '[c]reation science' is unquestionably a 'term of
art,' . . . and thus, under Louisiana Law, is 'to be interpreted
according to [its] received meaning and acceptation with the
learned in the art, trade or profession to which [it] re-
fer[s].' "" Because the affidavits of experts in the field attest
to the purely scientific nature of creation-science, the Court
should "assume that the Balanced Treatment Act does not re-
quire the presentation of religious doctrine."9
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
This analysis will focus on two major legal issues impli-
cated in Edwards: the application of the establishment clause
to this Act and how the Court interpreted the Act to violate
the establishment clause.' In regard to the establishment
clause, this note will briefly survey the bases for current es-
tablishment clause interpretation and focus on the Lemon test
89. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
90. 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (abortion funding).
91. 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws).
92. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2594 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 2583-84.
94. Id. at 2592 (citations omitted).
95. Id. (emphasis in original).
96. Although important, this article forgoes a full discussion of any
issue regarding the Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment. This is partly
because the posture of the case before the Court is dealt with in the section
of this article dealing with interpretation of the Act and partly to limit the
scope of this article.
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and its application in Edwards. In regard to state statutory
construction, this note will examine and analyze the princi-
ples of interpretation the Court applied in Edwards.
A. Everson and Lemon: The Current Bases for Establishment
Clause Interpretation
The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the Free exercise thereof."9 'The debate over the first
amendment's meaning is perennial.' 8
With respect to the establishment clause of the amend-
ment, constitutional scholars have taken two basic positions
concerning the original intent of its framers.99 One position
maintains that the establishment clause is intended to pro-
scribe preferential treatment of one religious sect over an-
other. The other view, the view taken by the majority of the
Supreme Court since the mid-1940s, is that the clause is in-
tended not merely to prohibit the establishment of a national
religion, but is intended to proscribe even nonpreferential as-
sistance to organized churches. 00 The Court has consistently
adopted the latter view of original intent.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
98. See, e.g., infra note 100.
99. Original intent may be no longer important in establishment
clause cases before the Supreme Court. In Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985), Justice Stevens implied that, regardless of the original intent be-
hind the clauses, stare decisis compels a different interpretation. He wrote:
At one time it was thought that this right merely proscribed the
preference of one Christian sect over another, but would not re-
quire equal respect for the conscience of the infidel, the atheist, or
adherent of non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism. But
when the underlying principle has been examined in the crucible of
litigation, the Court has unambiguously concluded that the individ-
ual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment em-
braces the right to select any religious faith or none at all.
Id. at 52-53 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). See also Justice Stewart's
dissent in School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
309-10 (1963).
For our purposes, however, in the seminal case in establishment clause
interpretation, Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Court
based its holding of strict separation on what it perceived to be the original
intent of the framers. Since Everson, the Supreme Court has decided estab-
lishment clause cases upon this interpretation.
100. Two current champions of the respective interpretations are
Professor Leo Pfeffer and Professor Robert Cord. Their arguments re-
volve primarily around three sources: Memorial & Remonstrance Against Re-
ligious Assessments, 1785, or Memorial by James Madison; Madison's Detached
Memoranda, apparently written by Madison after he left the presidency;
and A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom in Virginia authored by Thomas
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In Everson v. Board of Education,"'1 the Supreme Court
first applied the establishment clause to the states and set
forth the principle used by the Court in deciding every estab-
lishment clause case since. New Jersey enacted a statute that
allowed the Board of Education in Ewing, New Jersey, to re-
imburse parents for the cost of transporting their children to
parochial schools by public busses. Everson sued as a taxpayer
claiming that the state violated the establishment clause by
using tax money to support and maintain Catholic schools.
Although the Court upheld the statute, Justice Black wrote:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any reli-
gion. No person can be punished for entertaining or pro-
fessing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance
or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small,
can be levied to support any religious activities or institu-
tions, whatever .... 102
The Court here adopted the view of the establishment clause
that maintains that "[i]n the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect
'a wall of separation between Church and State.' "'03 That is,
the Court adopted a view of strict separation.' 0" Since Ever-
son, state laws which mandated school prayer, etc. have been
struck down on the basis of this decision.
Jefferson. Although the Memorial and Bill for Religious Freedom were origi-
nally aimed at the established church in Virginia, they are used as indica-
tors of what Madison and Jefferson had in mind when framing the estab-
lishment clause. For a full treatment of both these positions, see L. PFEFFER,
CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM (1967), and R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH
AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982).
101. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
102. Id. at 15-16.
103. Id. at 16 (citation omitted).
104. The Court's upholding the statute, despite its strict separation
language, did not go unnoticed by Justice Jackson. He said, "[T]he under-
tones of the opinion, advocating complete and uncompromising separation
of Church from State, seem utterly discordant with its conclusion.
Id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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The Court's view of strict separation was later modified,
and in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp 1°5 the
Court adopted a view of the establishment clause that re-
quired legislation to maintain neutrality towards religion. In
other words, if the purpose or primary effect is either "the
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment ex-
ceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the
Constitution. "106
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,1 0 7 the Court set forth the standard
used to determine whether state action violates the establish-
ment clause. In Lemon, the Court considered both Pennsylva-
nia and Rhode Island statutes that reimbursed teachers of
secular subjects in parochial schools. The Court set forth the
three-pronged test: "First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . .;
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive entanglement
with religion.' "108 The Court has applied this test in virtually
every establishment clause case since June of 1971.1'09 Never-
theless, in only one case prior to Lemon and in two cases after,
but before Edwards, has the Court struck down a state action
for lack of a secular purpose."1
105. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). In Abington, the Court struck down Penn-
sylvania and Maryland statutes requiring readings from the Bible at the
beginning of each school day.
106. Id. at 222.
107. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
108. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
109. In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), the Court upheld
the practice of paying a salary to the chaplain who opened legislative ses-
sions with a prayer. The Court did not apply the Lemon test, rather, it up-
held the statute on the grounds that because the practice has continually
existed for 200 years, it "has become part of the fabric of our society." Id.
at 792. Also, "it is simply a tolerable acknowledgement of beliefs widely
held among the people of this country." Id. Justice Brennan, with whom
Justice Marshall joined, dissented, holding that the Lemon test should have
been applied. Id. at 796-97.
In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court upheld a city's
practice of including a nativity scene in its Christmas display. The Court
applied the Lemon test and found that the practice had a secular purpose.
Id. at 680-81 ("to celebrate the Holiday and to depict the origins of that
Holiday"). Neither did the Court find that the primary effect of the prac-
tice was to advance religion. Lastly, the Court found that there was no
evidence of excessive entanglement. Justice Brennan dissented saying,
"[Tihe Court's less-than-vigorous application of the Lemon test suggests
that its commitment to those standards may only be superficial." Id. at 697
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
110. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449
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In Epperson v. Arkansas,111 the Supreme Court invali-
dated an act that prohibited teachers from teaching evolution
or the use of textbooks that teach evolution. The Court held
that the "law selects from the body of knowledge a particular
segment which it proscribes for the sole reason that it is
deemed to conflict with a particular religious doctrine
... ""2 Because the Court could find no other reason for
the proscription of the teaching of evolution and because all
the evidence indicated that the act was "a product of the up-
surge of 'fundamentalist' religious fervor," ' the Court
found that the sole purpose of the act was to "advance reli-
gion." Therefore, the Court held that the act violated the
establishment clause.
In Stone v. Graham, 4 the Court considered legislation
enacted by the state of Kentucky requiring the posting of the
Ten Commandments in public school classrooms. 15 Al-
though the act claimed that the Ten Commandments have a
secular application, the Court found the statute served no sec-
ular purpose. The Court held that the "Ten Commandments
are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian
faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular pur-
pose can blind us to that fact."116 The Court based its hold-
ing on the first three commandments which require worship
of God and observance of the Sabbath and prohibit the tak-
ing of His name in vain. 1
In Wallace v. Jaffree, 8 the Court invalidated an Alabama
statute, which authorized'a daily period of silence in public
schools for meditation or voluntary prayer. The Court found
that the statute had no secular purpose. The Court based its
holding on the legislative history and the relationship of the
statute to two other measures considered in the case. The
Court looked at "[t]he unrebutted evidence of legislative in-
tent contained in the legislative record and in the testimony
U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1104 (1981); Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
111. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
112. Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 98.
114. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1104
(1981).
115. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.178 (Baldwin 1980).
116. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41 (footnote omitted).
117. Id. at 42 (citations omitted).
118. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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of the sponsor ... "119 The sponsor of the statute stated
that he had no other purpose-except to return voluntary
prayer to the public schools. This lack of a secular purpose
was supported by the fact that the statute in question added
nothing to prior state actions allowing a one minute period of
silent meditation except the words "or voluntary prayer.' 12 0
Discovering a preeminent religious purpose is easy in the
above cases. The same cannot be said of Edwards. First, un-
like Epperson, the Creationism Act did not ban the teaching
of evolution. Rather, the Balanced Treatment required the
teaching of evolution if creation science was taught. This re-
quirement meshes with the stated purpose of academic free-
dom if academic freedom is interpreted as the students' free-
dom from indoctrination. Also, unlike the statute at issue in
Epperson, "the Balanced Treatment Act did not fly through
the Louisiana Legislature on wings of fundamentalist reli-
gious fervor .... 1" The Louisiana Legislature instead
passed the Act after seven hearings and several months of
study and revision.
The Louisiana Act differs from the statute in Stone in
that the concept of creation, despite the Court's assumption,
is not necessarily the sectarian belief of a Christian church.'22
The Commandments which condemned the Kentucky statute
are distinctly Judeo-Christian and the result of revelation
rather than maxims arrived at by human reason. Creation, on
the other hand, is first of all not an exclusively Judeo-Chris-
tian concept.1 23 Second, and more important for this case,
creation as used in the statute has its basis in scientific evi-
dence. Nowhere does the Act speculate on the nature of the
creator, and the legislative history only speculates that it is
supernatural and intelligent. 24
Wallace differs from Edwards in almost every respect, at
least in regard to the Act itself. Still, a more important differ-
ence for the purposes of this note is the Court's use of the
legislative history in the respective cases. In Wallace, the
Court could not find any evidence of a secular purpose for
the Act in the legislative history. Furthermore, the state
119. Id. at 58.
120. Id. at 59.
121. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2597 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
122. Brief for Appellants at 13-14, Edwards v. Aguillard 107 S. Ct.
2573 (1987) (No. 85-1513).
123. Id. at 13 and n.54.
124. Id. at 7-10.
1988]
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
made no effort to produce one. 2 ' In Edwards, however, the
legislative history contains several statements attesting to the
Act's secular purpose as well as the scientific validity of the
subject matter. Clearly, the Court in Edwards has extended
its application of the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test.
B. Interpreting the Creationism Act
H.L.A. Hart stated, "The hard truth of the matter is
that American Courts have no intelligible, generally ac-
cepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpre-
tation."' 2 Hart's statement is borne out by the fact that no
definitive set of rules has been assembled except in a way that
simply offers alternative principles of interpretation. 2 7 Nev-
ertheless, one cardinal principle of interpretation exists that
always applies or underlies any other, namely, "to save and
not to destroy."'2 6 Along with this principle goes the pre-
sumption of reasonableness and constitutionality of a statute
and a conforming interpretation.' 29 If no reasonable and con-
stitutional construction of the statute exists, a court cannot
apply it. In Edwards, the Court effectively held that there is
none for the Louisiana Balanced Treatment Act.
The "Purpose" section of the Louisiana Creationism Act
provides that it "is enacted for the purposes of protecting ac-
ademic freedom."' 30 The Supreme Court in Edwards, how-
125. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 57 (1985).
126. H. HART, JR. & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1201 (tentative ed.
1958) as found in R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
STATUTES 1 (1975).
127. See, e.g., N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, §
45.07 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1984).
128. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
129. "It has been called a golden rule of statutory interpretation that
unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible
interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in
favor of another which would produce a reasonable result." N. SINGER,
supra note 127, § 45.12, at 54 (footnote omitted). Further, "the fact that
one among alternative constructions would involve serious constitutional
difficulties is reason to reject that interpretation in favor of another." Id. §
45.11, at 46 (footnote omitted). "It is well settled that this Court will not
pass on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided." United
States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980) (citations omitted). "We have re-
peatedly held that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by
one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain
duty is to adopt that which will save the Act." NRLB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
130. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.2 (West 1982).
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ever, held that "the petitioners have identified no clear secu-
lar purpose for the Louisiana Act."'181 Instead, the Court
found that the "Act does not serve to protect academic free-
dom, but has the distinctly different purpose of discrediting
'evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with
the teaching of creation science ... .' "13 The Court held
further that the "primary purpose of the Creationism Act is
to advance a particular religious belief .... ""'
The standards of interpretation the Court applied to ar-
rive at this conclusion are unclear. It appears that the basis of
this holding is what the Court calls the "actual intent,'' or
motivation of the legislators. To discover the "actual intent,"
the Court turns to the legislative history and focuses on state-
ments made by Senator Keith, the Act's sponsor. The dissent
objects to the use of "motivation" as the standard for deter-
mining the purpose of the Act, because it is not at all clear
that the Act was motivated wholly by religious considera-
tions. In the three cases before Edwards, where the Court
struck down a state action for not having a secular purpose,
the Court found that the state actions were motivated wholly
by religious considerations. In Edwards, as the dissent noted,
the Act's stated purpose refutes the argument that the moti-
vation behind it was wholly religious. Implicitly, the dissent is
objecting to the Court's application of the "plain meaning"
rule,"3 5 in one instance, and the Court's willingness to turn to
the legislative history and select statements that condemn the
Act, in another.
1. The Plain Meaning of the Act
The "plain meaning" rule requires that a court attempt
to take a statute at face value. In other words, if the statute is
clear on its face, a Court should not go beyond it into legisla-
131. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2578 (1987).
132. Id. at 2580 (citation omitted).
133. Id. at 2582.
134. Id. at 2576.
135. The Supreme Court described the "plain meaning" rule as
follows:
If the words convey a definite meaning which involves no absurd-
ity, nor any contradiction of other parts of the instrument, then
that meaning, apparent on the face of the instrument, must be
accepted, and neither the courts nor the legislature have the right
to add to it or take from it.
Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 (1889) (citations omitted). See
also N. SINGER, supra note 127, at § 46.01.
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tive history or other extrinsic aids to interpretation. 18 In Ed-
wards, the Court apparently attempted to read the statute at
face value when it called on "common parlance" to interpret
academic freedom as an instructor's freedom "to teach what
[he] will." ' Although the Court rightly concluded that the
Act did not further that purpose, the dissent argued that the
Court should have interpreted "academic freedom" to mean
students "freedom from indoctrination. 1 8 Indeed, the dis-
sent's interpretation of academic freedom is the only one in
the particular context 3 9 of the Act that makes sense. If the
Act requires balanced treatment of the two sciences on the
part of teachers, then the Act clearly does not promote the
freedom of teachers to teach what they will.
The Sutherland treatise Statutes and Statutory Construction
states that "the customary meaning of words will be disre-
garded when it is obvious from the act itself that the legisla-
ture intended that it be used in a sense different from its
common meaning." 1"' The Supreme Court also has recog-
nized that although "statutory language should be inter-
preted whenever possible according to common usage, some
terms acquire a special technical meaning by a process of ju-
dicial construction." 41 In Edwards, the Court reasoned that
because the legislature amended the purpose statement of the
statute to exclude the language "academic freedom . . . of
students . . . and assisting students in their search for
truth,"' "4 the legislators did not intend that meaning of aca-
demic freedom. 43 As the dissent notes, however, "[t]he Sen-
ate Committee on Education deleted most of the lengthy
'purpose' section of the bill (with Senator Keith's consent) be-
cause it resembled legislative 'findings of fact,' which, com-
mittee members felt, should generally not be incorporated in
legislation." '"4
4
136. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
137. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2578 (1987).
138. Id. at 2601 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
139. Particular context here means the "narrower sense of internal
syntactical structure." R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION
OF STATUTES 108 (1975).
140. N. SINGER, supra note 127, § 46.01, at 74 (footnote omitted).
141. Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 641 (1954).
142. Joint Appendix at E-292, Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573
(1987) (No. 85-1513) (emphasis added).
143. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2580 n.8.
144. Id. at 2601 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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As we have seen, at least two of the objections made by
the Court regarding the Act's stated purpose of protecting
academic freedom rely on the notion that academic freedom
means the freedom of teachers to teach what they will.14
This interpretation of academic freedom is incorrect given
both the immediate context of the stated purpose in the Act
itself and in the context of the legislative history.
2. Use or Abuse of Legislative History
When we decide from legislative history, including
statements of witnesses at hearings, what Congress probably
had in mind, we must put ourselves in the place of a major-
ity of Congressmen and act according to the impression we
think this history should have made on them. . . . That
process seems to me not interpretation of a statute but crea-
tion of a statute.146
Thus Justice Robert Jackson described the danger of inter-
preting legislation by its legislative history. Indeed, the "plain
meaning" rule avoids this problem by requiring courts to in-
terpret the statute only from its face if reasonably possible. 47
In Edwards, however, the Court could not find a reasonable
or constitutional interpretation of the Louisiana statute from
its face.' 8 The Court went even further and said that there is
no possible constitutional interpretation. Consequently, in-
stead of turning to the legislative history for the statute's con-
struction, the Court did so for its destruction.
In order to conclude that the Act had a preeminent reli-
gious purpose, the Court essentially made a finding of fact
that " 'creation-science' . . . embodies the religious belief that
a supernatural creator was responsible for the creation of hu-
mankind."' 49 This finding of fact was based partly on prior
Supreme Court case law dealing with evolution 50 and partly
145. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
146. United States v. Public Util. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953)
(Jackson, J., concurring), quoted in N. SINGER, supra note 127, § 48.02, at
285 (footnote omitted).
147. See supra note 135.
148. "The question for decision is whether ... [the] Act . . . is
facially invalid as violative of the Establishment Clause .... We therefore
conclude that the District Court did not err in finding that appellants failed
to raise a genuine issue of material fact, and in granting summary judg-
ment." Edwards v. Aguillard 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2575, 2584 (1987) (emphasis
added).
149. Id. at 2582 (emphasis added).
150. See id. at 2580-81; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-09
(1968).
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on statements made in legislative hearings by both an expert
and the Act's sponsor.' Here, we will focus on the Court's
use of the legislative history.
The Court first looked at the statements of Edward Bou-
dreaux, an expert on creation-science, who testified at the
legislative hearings." 2 Boudreaux commented that creation-
science included a belief in the existence of a supernatural
creator. 53 Without explaining why the concept of a creator is
necessarily religious, the Court stated that the Act clearly
"advance[s] the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being
created humankind.""' In its statement, the Court begged
the central question in the case, namely, whether the concept
of creation is necessarily religious.1 55
Instead of giving a basis for this finding of fact, the
Court used certain legislators' statements, especially those of
Senator Keith, to support its claim that the Act was moti-
vated by a religious purpose. For example, the Court noted a
remark by Senator Keith that "his disdain for the theory of
evolution resulted from the support that evolution supplied
to views contrary to his own religious beliefs." 1" The Court
concluded from such statements that "the legislation there-
fore sought to alter the science curriculum to reflect endorse-
ment of a religious view that is antagonistic to the theory of
evolution.' 57
Two problems arise from the Court's reasoning in re-
gard to this conclusion. First, as noted above, " the Court
offered no support for its conclusion that creation or the con-
cept of a creator is necessarily religious. The dissent suggests
that this issue should be given a full evidentiary hearing.'59
151. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2581-82.
152. Id. at 2581.
153. Joint Appendix at E-421-22, Edwards v. Aguillard 107 S. Ct.
2573 (1987) (No. 85-1513).
154. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2581 (footnote omitted).
155. If the question before the Court was to decide whether the Act
violated the establishment clause, the Court begs the question by defining
creation, and thereby the Act, as inherently religious. Instead, the Court
should remand the case in order to allow the lower courts to look at the
evidence presented to determine whether the concept of creation is neces-
sarily religious.
156. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2582.
157. Id.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 147-57.




Also, as the dissent notes, even if the theory of creation-sci-
ence coincides with the religious belief of a legislator, so
what? "We surely would not strike down a law providing
money to feed the hungry or shelter the homeless if it could
be demonstrated that, but for the religious beliefs of the leg-
islators, the funds would not have been approved.""16 So in
this case, if creation-science turns out to be a legitimate scien-
tific theory that, when presented to children, truly enhances
and complements their knowledge about origins, the personal
beliefs or motivations of legislators is of little consequence.
The second problem with the Court's decision is re-
flected in the statement of Justice Jackson quoted above.''
The Court assumed from the statements of two or three indi-
viduals that the state legislature acted with a similar intent
and by the same motivation. The problems with such an as-
sumption are obvious." 2 As Professor Radin states, "the in-
tention of the legislature is undiscoverable in any real sense
... .The chances that of several hundred men, each will
have exactly the same . . . situation . . . [is] infinitesimally
small."' 3
An argument can be made that, because Senator Keith
sponsored the Act, the legislators probably accepted his rep-
resentations of its purpose and effect. However, circum-
stances present in Edwards refute this argument. The Court
demonstrated that Senator Keith had a personal interest in
the bill. One should not assume, however, that the whole leg-
islature had the same interests in mind when passing the bill.
Presumably, the majority of the Louisiana Legislature did not
share Senator Keith's fundamentalist beliefs. 64 On the con-
trary, the legislative history indicates that at least initially
some hostility to the legislation existed. As the dissent notes,
"Senator Keith's statements before the various committees
that considered the bill hardly reflect the confidence of a
man preaching to the converted. He asked his colleagues to
'keep an open mind' and not to be 'biased' by misleading
160. Id. at 2594 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
162. See N. SINGER, supra note 127, at § 48.15.
163. Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930).
164.
Religion
The following table shows the religion of legislators. Almost half are
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characterizations of creation science." '166 Consequently Sena-
tor Keith's motivation or actual purpose in sponsoring the
Act probably is not the same as the majority of the
legislature.
The Court's turning to the legislative history is not ob-
jectionable, at least if the Court sincerely failed to find a le-
gitimate plain meaning to the statute on its face. The Court,
however, seemed to have chosen selectively parts of the his-
tory that might imply a religious purpose, while ignoring
parts that might have aided the Court in discovering a legiti-
mate secular purpose to the Act.
CONCLUSION
From the discussion of two of the legal issues in Edwards,
one can draw two conclusions: 1) the Court is more willing
now than in the past to strike down a statute on the basis of
the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test and 2) the Court,
in interpreting the Balanced Treatment Act, adopted the im-
possible standard of discerning the actual intent of the legis-
lators. However questionable these two results are, one
should note in concluding that the immediate result in Ed-
wards calls into question the Court's commitment to another
principle the Court has viewed as important, namely, aca-
demic freedom.
Catholic, and another 26% are Baptist. Members of the 1980 Legislature
had similar religious preferences.
Senators Representatives Total
Religion Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Baptist 12 31% 26 25% 38 26%
Catholic 17 44 51 48 68 47
Episcopalian 0 0 2 2 2 1
Methodist 5 13 11 10 16 11
Presbyterian 2 5 6 6 8 6
Other/Not
Reporting 3 8 9 9 12 9
PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF LOUISIANA, CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE
1984 LOUISIANA LEGISLATURE 38 (1984).
This table indicates that over half the Louisiana legislators, at the time
the Act was passed, most likely were not fundamentalist, assuming that 3%
of the other groups besides the Catholics were not fundamentalist.




In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,'0 6 Justice Brennan wrote,
"The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The
Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers
truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through
any kind of authoritative selection.' ,,167 In Board of Education
v. Pico,'68 the Court reaffirmed this principle saying that the
"transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment"' 69 bind
states and local school boards in their educational policies. A
conflict with this principle arises in Edwards in regard to the
teaching of creation-science on account of its perceived reli-
gious nature. From this we conclude that, in a conflict be-
tween the first amendment freedom of speech concerns and
establishment clause concerns, the establishment clause
controls.
Few would disagree with this conclusion, especially if the
religious values taught were not their own. In Edwards, how-
ever, no trial took place at which creation-science was deter-
mined to be religious in nature. Both of the lower courts that
held that the Act violated the establishment clause said in ef-
fect that the factual basis of creation-science is unimportant.
Rather, they held that the notion of a creator is necessarily
religious in nature, that the teaching of creation-science in
public classrooms violates the establishment clause, and that
creation-science should therefore be banned from public
schools. 70  The Supreme Court agreed with these
conclusions.
But what of discovering the truth through the market-
place of ideas, or is this case "Scopes-in-reverse" as the dissent
suggests?"7 If creation-science is fully supported by scientific
166. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
167. Id. at 603 (citation omitted).
168. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
169. Id. at 864.
170. See Aguillard v. Treen, 634 F. Supp. 426, 427 (1985)
("Whatever 'science' may be, 'creation,' as the term is used in the statute,
involves religion, and the teaching of 'creation-science' and 'creationism,'
as contemplated by the statute, involves teaching 'tailored to the principles'
of a particular religious sect or group of sects." (citation omitted)). See also
Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251, 1253 (1985) ("[I]rrespective of
whether it is fully supported by scientific evidence, the theory of creation is
a religious belief.").
171. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2604 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Both sides in Edwards liken this case to Scopes. Those who ar-
gue that the Creationism Act seeks to discredit evolution with religious
doctrine see Edwards as parallel to Scopes. See Aguillard v. Edwards, 765
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evidence, but is banned from the public schools, students
surely are not allowed to reach the whole truth in regard to
origins. Justice Scalia correctly suggested in his dissent that
that concern warrants a trial to determine whether creation-
science is indeed religious rather than basing a decision on an
a priori concept of its religious nature. 17 2
F.2d 1253 (1985). Those who see the Court precluding the introduction of
a legitimate science see Edwards as a "Scopes-in-reverse." See supra note 12.
172. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2592 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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